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FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVACY, POVERTY AND POLICING
Kami Chavis Simmons*
For decades, the reasonable expectation of privacy has been the
primary  standard  by  which  courts  have  determined  whether  a  “search”  
has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme   Court’s   recent   decision   in   U.S. v. Jones, however, has
reinvigorated   the   physical   trespass   doctrine’s   importance   when  
determining   whether   there   has   been   a   “search”   triggering  
constitutional protection. 1 Recognizing the unpredictability of the
reasonable   expectation   of   privacy   doctrine   and   that   doctrine’s   bias  
against the urban poor, many scholars hope that the Jones opinion may
ameliorate the class divide that has developed in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
This Article argues that while Jones has reiterated that a
physical trespass may trigger Fourth Amendment protection, this
holding alone will not result in any appreciable strengthening of the
privacy rights of the urban poor. The manner in which urban, innercity communities are over-policed and the aggressive law enforcement
strategies employed in these areas, along with the current
constitutional regime that has allowed these practices to flourish, are
primarily responsible for the privacy inequities.2
In the United States, our political and economic structure has
always allowed for a certain degree of stratification among different
socio-economic groups. Privacy rights are changing for everyone. 3
In our society, it is widely accepted that wealthier people are able to
purchase lifestyles that may afford them more comforts than the poor.
*Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Wake Forest
University School of Law, J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A. ,The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to thank Roger Fairfax, Michael Pinard,
Yoland Vasquez, Kristen Henning, Andrea Dennis, and Renee Hutchins for their
thoughtful comments, and Ashley Brompton and Paul Havenstein for their diligent
research.
1
U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2
See generally William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (1999).
3
See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1444–45 (2012). There is certainly an argument to be made
that privacy rights are changing for all – especially those who can afford electronics
or  devices  that  are  more  easily  “searched”  or  susceptible  to  government  surveillance.  
Id.
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Such basic inequalities are a way of life. Society should, however, be
less willing to accept the disturbing reality that income or wealth
increasingly determines the amount of protection the Constitution
guarantees.  Nowhere  is  this  “Constitutional  inequality”  more  apparent  
than   when   analyzing   the   Supreme   Court’s   Fourth   Amendment  
jurisprudence and its application in determining when the government
has violated an  individual’s  privacy  rights.    
Scholars   have   long   argued   that   the   traditional   “reasonable  
expectation   of   privacy”   analysis   used   to   determine   whether   the  
government has violated the Fourth Amendment tends to disadvantage
groups on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum because their
jobs and homes (or lack thereof) afford them less privacy than their
wealthier counterparts.4 William   Stuntz’s   discussion   of   this   dilemma  
in his 1999 essay entitled Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
details how Fourth Amendment doctrine disadvantages the
disadvantaged. 5 Since Stuntz published his essay, modest
improvements in police-community relations may have occurred
across the country, but for inner-city urban communities, tensions
between police and residents have become exacerbated.6 The debate
4

See id. at 1392–93.
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1272–73.
6
In recent years, policies such as stop-and-frisk in New York City have sparked
criticism with many, arguing that the policy is implemented in a racially
discriminatory manner. See Steven Zeidman, Whither the Criminal Court:
Confronting Stops-and-Frisks, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2013) (“[T]he  NYPD  
brazenly uses Terry to defend, and perpetuate, vast numbers of stops-and-frisks and
enormous  racial  disparities  in  who  gets  stopped.”). Several high-profile deaths of
unarmed African American men have sparked mass protests nationwide; for
example, on January 1, 2009, Oscar Grant was fatally shot by a Bay Area Transit
officer in Oakland, CA. Michael McLaughlin, Ex-Transit Officer Who Killed Oscar
Grant, Unarmed Black Man, Wins Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 2, 2014, 1:59
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/01/oscar-grant-lawsuit-bartofficer_n_5548719.html. In New York City, Eric Garner, an unarmed AfricanAmerican man, died after being placed in a chokehold on July 17, 2014 after officers
approached him for selling untaxed cigarettes. See James Queally & Alana Semuels,
Eric  Garner’s  Death  in  NYPD  Chokehold  Case  Ruled  a  Homicide, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
1, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-garnerhomicide-20140801-story.html. Meanwhile, the now notorious killing of Michael
Brown, an unarmed teen, in Ferguson, Missouri, has served to bring these inequities
back into the mainstream consciousness. Wesley Lowery & Mark Berman, Police
Wound Man Amid Protests Over Michael Brown Killing, WASH. POST, (Aug. 13,
2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/13/report5
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concerning   privacy   and   poverty   remains   relevant,   and   Stuntz’s  
proscriptions for shifting the Fourth Amendment from protecting
privacy to other interests are perhaps more salient now than when he
penned his essay.
From the beginning, it is essential to note why this Article
limits   its   discussion   to   privacy   issues   as   they   relate   to   the   “urbandwelling   poor,”   not   just   those   who   live   in   urban   areas,   and   not   just  
those who are poor. As I discuss below, the current standard for
determining whether a search has occurred under the Fourth
Amendment affords less privacy to those living in close quarters,
hence the focus on urban area. In certain parts of the country, many
impoverished residents may still live in single-family homes or in
residential areas where police patrols and contact with police are less
frequent than those within urban areas.7
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that neighborhoods experiencing
concentrated urban poverty also experience policing in a markedly
different manner than rural or suburban communities with more
affluent residents.8 It is widely known, for example, that   “[r]esidents
of poor neighborhoods are more frequently subject to searches of their
person in the form of overly aggressive stop and frisk tactics.” 9 The
urban elite experience police protection in a different manner than
those  who  live  in  “high  crime  areas”  and  generally  have  more  privacy  
police-wound-man-in-ferguson-protest-over-michael-brown-killing; see also Julie
Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Grief and Protests Follow Shooting of a
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say-mike-brown-was-killed-afterstruggle-for-gun.html?r=0.
7
William Stuntz clarifies this point by explaining that the urban poor, because of
their class and location, are uniquely positioned to experience the inequities of the
Fourth Amendment. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1272 (explaining that while poverty is
not exclusively an urban phenomenon, concentrated urban poverty creates its own
set of issues – those who live in cities tend to live in apartment buildings and spend
more time on the street, two situational contexts that afford them less privacy). He
also notes that concentrated urban poverty has a racial dimension as well because
poor blacks are more likely to live in cities, while poor whites are dispersed and tend
not to live near large numbers of other poor whites. Id. at 1272–73.
8
See id. at 1271.
9
Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the
Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 297, 317 (2011).
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within their urban dwellings, such as 24-hour doormen, passcodes and
other features that enhance the privacy of these residents. 10 The
differences in the way law enforcement officers police and monitor the
urban-dwelling poor is central to my thesis that the Jones opinion,
with its emphasis on the physical trespass doctrine, will have little
significance for the privacy rights of those living in these
communities.
This Article will explain how current Fourth Amendment
standards afford less protection to economically disadvantaged
citizens (particularly, the urban-dwelling poor) when compared with
more affluent citizens. I will also argue that this jurisprudence is
largely  unchanged  by  the  Court’s  recent  decision  in  U.S. v. Jones.
In Jones, the Court relies on the physical trespass doctrine in
finding  that  the  government  violated  a  defendant’s  rights  by  attaching
a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device on his car and
tracking the vehicle for nearly a month.11 In this way, the opinion in
Jones does not reach the most pernicious government practices,
including pre-textual traffic stops, which the Court has deemed
Constitutional, and aggressive stop and frisk policies employed by
many urban police departments. These tactics, which are employed
almost exclusively in economically depressed, traditionally
disadvantaged, and overwhelmingly minority areas, threaten the
legitimacy of law enforcement in the precise areas that could benefit
from increased cooperation between police and citizens to eradicate
crime.
Finally, while this Article ultimately concludes that Jones is
not the catalyst for the desperately needed doctrinal change, several
extrajudicial solutions are suggested to ensure fair and just law
enforcement strategies within the most vulnerable communities. Thus,
the goal of this Article is not to enter the debate about whether Jones’  
10

See also Robin M. Collin & Robert W. Collin, Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?,
8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 181, 189–93  (1991)  (asserting  that  “privacy  is  a  
commodity  which  is  bought  and  sold,”  leaving  poor  people  to  be  “compelled  to live
in conditions where their economic condition affects their ability to satisfy their taste
for privacy and may affect their ability to enforce privacy related rights against
trespass  and  seclusion.”).
11
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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emphasis on trespass will increase privacy protections for the urban
poor, but rather to reiterate that, due to the manner in which these
communities are policed, advocates should place more emphasis on
extrajudicial means to improve the privacy rights of citizens.
Part I of this Article will briefly summarize the current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and explain how the current framework
could be construed to afford less protection to impoverished urban
dwellers. In particular, this part will focus on the traditional
“reasonableness   of   expectation   of   privacy”   analysis   as   articulated   in  
Katz v. United States.12 In this seminal opinion, the Court held that
“the   Fourth   Amendment   protects   people,   not   places,”   and   found   that  
the   government’s   attachment   of   an   eavesdropping   device to the
outside of a phone booth was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.13 This decision represented a dramatic departure
from the decision in Olmstead v. U.S., in which the Court held that
because no physical trespass had occurred, there was no search, and
thus no Fourth Amendment violation. 14 It   was   Justice   Harlan’s  
concurrence in the Katz opinion, however, that would come to
dominate the analysis that courts used to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment had been implicated.15
Since the Katz opinion, the courts have relied on the principle
that the Fourth Amendment is triggered only when the government
violates   a   “reasonable   expectation   of   privacy.” 16 Simply stated, the
Katz standard, as it has become known, means that if law enforcement
agents can see, hear, or smell things that members of the public could
see, hear, or smell, then there is no Fourth Amendment violation. It is
easy to see the consequences that this doctrine may have on the most
vulnerable in society. Stuntz perhaps best articulated this principle
when he noted that, ironically, the Fourth Amendment protects those
who already enjoy the most privacy.17

12

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 351.
14
277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
15
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360.
16
Id. at 360–61.
17
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1266.
13
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Part II briefly discusses the U.S. v. Jones opinion and assesses
whether Jones represents a doctrinal shift in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence that potentially could offer greater protections for the
urban-dwelling poor. This section explains that while Jones has
initiated an important conversation about privacy, the decision and its
doctrinal underpinnings make it an inadequate tool to fully address the
privacy inequity between the urban poor and other segments of
society. Part II discusses how police tactics employed in
neighborhoods experiencing concentrated poverty exacerbate the
privacy inequities between these communities and other affluent
communities, and therefore any solution, whether doctrinal or
otherwise, must address these tactics in order to remedy the class
divide in Fourth Amendment protections.
Part III explains the fundamental flaws that exist within current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that allow these inequities in
privacy distribution to occur, thus preventing the incremental
improvement that Jones makes   from   adequately   protecting   society’s  
most vulnerable citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court’s  seminal  decisions  in  Terry v. Ohio and Whren v. United States,
despite their articulation of minimal constitutional standards, continue
to detrimentally impact the urban poor by allowing investigatory
detentions in the absence of probable cause and allowing pre-textual
stops.18 Given the nature of criminal investigations in urban areas and
the tactics officers use to police these areas, the concepts in Terry and
Whren have a more direct application in that context than does the
Jones physical trespass doctrine. Unfortunately, the standards in those
cases allow too much discretion and are prone to arbitrary
discrimination   against   some   of   society’s   most   disenfranchised  
members.19
Part IV argues that given the inadequacy of Jones to correct the
privacy inequities that exist between the urban poor and other groups,
these communities should turn to legislative policy solutions rather
than relying upon Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Community
members must retain control of the criminal justice priorities in their
18

See Zeidman, supra note 6, at 1192 (explaining how Terry disproportionately
affected men of color in highly policed neighborhoods); see also Stuntz, supra note
2, at 1271–72 (explaining the parameters of Whren during traffic stops).
19
Zeidman, supra note 6, at 1194; Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1293.
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neighborhoods and should advocate for certain legislative changes to
improve crime enforcement in these areas. This section concludes by
suggesting a number of legislative solutions that might spur changes in
the manner in which urban neighborhoods are policed and could
therefore ameliorate some of the Fourth Amendment concerns most
relevant to those areas.
I. KATZ: “THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY” STANDARD
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE URBAN POOR
A. Katz v. United States
The Fourth Amendment states  that  the  “right   of  the  people  to  
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable   searches   and   seizures   shall   not   be   violated.” 20 Prior to
1967,  the  Court’s  decision  in  Olmstead governed the law of search and
seizure. Olmstead held   that   if   the   government   trespassed   upon   one’s  
property,   there   was   a   “search”   that   triggered   Fourth   Amendment  
protection.21 Conversely, if there was no trespass, then there was no
search, and thus no Fourth Amendment protection. Pursuant to this
reasoning, the Court held in Olmstead, that there was no search when
government  agents  intercepted  petitioners’  conversations,  because  the  
wires   they   used   to   do   so   were   “not   part   of   [a]   house   or   office,   any  
more than are the highways along which they are stretched.”22 Based
on this formulation, the Fourth Amendment only protected searches
and seizures of people and tangible items. Congress quickly responded
by creating legislation prohibiting the government conduct at issue in
Olmstead.23
20

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The  right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons to
things  to  be  seized.”).
21
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
22
Id. at 465–66.
23
See Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward by Looking Backward: United States v.
Jones Predicts Fourth Amendment Property Rights Protections in E-Mail, 24 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 349,  358  (2013)  (“Responding  to  the  Katz decision,
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,”  which  “‘prohibits  the  unauthorized  use  of  surveillance  techniques  .  .  .  by  
public and private actors, but permits law enforcement to use such techniques in
controlled and well-defined  circumstances.’”).
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Then, in 1967, the Katz Court explicitly overturned Olmstead,
and  held  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  “protects  people  not  places”  and  
found that placing a listening device on top of a phone booth to
intercept conversations that occurred within that phone booth
constituted a search, despite the fact that there was no physical
trespass. 24 In   Justice   Harlan’s   concurrence,   he   famously   proclaimed  
that the test for whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable
required a two-part analysis to determine whether the person exhibited
an actual subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation
was one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. 25 It is
in the concurrence that Harlan articulates the proposition that
government   activity   that   violates   “the   reasonable   expectation   of
privacy”  constitutes  a  search.26
The Katz opinion   now   meant   that   there   could   be   a   “search”
within the Fourth Amendment, even if no physical trespass occurred.
B. Critiquing Katz and its Impact on the Privacy Rights of the
Urban Poor
Critics have characterized the Katz opinion   as   “poorly  
reasoned”  for  several  reasons.  Arnold  Loewy  explains  that  the  notion  
that   the   “Fourth   Amendment   protects   people   not   places”   is  
troublesome  because  “the  amount  of  protection  a  person  receives,  both  
prior to and after the Katz opinion, is   “completely   dependent   upon  
‘place.’”27 For example, Loewy points out that a person’s  home  almost  
always requires probable cause and a warrant, while searches of other
effects, such as a car, can be searched in the absence of a warrant or
with less than probable cause.28
In addition to setting forth an amorphous standard for
determining whether the government activity in question implicates
24

Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 361.
26
Id. at 361–62.
27
Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return to Trespass- Good News or Bad,
82 MISS. L.J. 879, 880 (2013).
28
Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (upholding a warrantless
inventory search of a vehicle as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
25
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the Fourth Amendment, critics have expressed concerns that the
“reasonable   expectation   of   privacy”   standard, could detrimentally
impact the rights of poor or economically disadvantaged groups. 29
The argument that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard
detrimentally impacts the poor stems from the current jurisprudence
and the primacy it affords the home under the Fourth Amendment. In
recent years, prior to Jones, the Court had reiterated the special
prominence the home receives under the Fourth Amendment. 30 The
home enjoys the greatest constitutional protection because government
surveillance is not constitutionally authorized without a judicially
approved warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.31
The curtilage, or area outside the home which is associated
with intimate home-like activities, also enjoys constitutional
29

Gilman, supra note 3, at 1392–93 (asserting  that  “people  who  live in crowded,
urban  neighborhoods  and  who  cannot  afford  ‘a  freestanding  home,  fences,  [and]  
lawns,’  have  a  lowered  expectation  of  privacy  and  are  thus  more  likely  to  suffer  
warrantless  searches  by  government  agents”  (quoting  Christopher  Slobogin,  The
Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401–05
(2003))). See also Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary,
61 CLEV. ST. L. REV.  137,  155  (2013)  (purporting  that  “while  wealthy  persons  are  
able to protect their privacy  with  ‘the  aid  of  electric  gates,  tall  fences,  security  
booths, remote cameras, motions sensors  and  roving  patrols,’…those who are not
able  to  afford  such  protections  will  be  subject  to  police  searches  on  their  property”  
(citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting))).
30
The primacy of the home can be illustrated by examining two similar cases: in
U.S. v. Knotts, which involved the use of a device by police to electronically track
the movements of a suspect along public roads, the Court held that monitoring the
suspect’s  movements  did  not  constitute  a  search  because  these  movements  occurred  
in public, and therefore did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 460 U.S. 276, 281–
82 (1983). However, in U.S. v. Karo, which involved government tracking of the
movement of chemical drums, the Court held that while tracking drums on the street
did not constitute a search, the Fourth Amendment was implicated once the drums
were tracked inside the house. 468 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1984).
31
See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1865 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The  dissent  argued  that  “searches  and  seizures  inside  a  home  without  a  warrant  are  
presumptively  unreasonable.”  Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006). This is because  “home  intrusions…are  indeed  ‘the chief evil against
which…the  Fourth  Amendment  is  directed.’”  Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585, 1379 (1980)). See also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1269 (noting that
“Fourth Amendment  law  regulates  house  searches  more  than  anything  else”  and  that  
“homes  are  almost  the  only  place  where  the  warrant  requirement  remains  
meaningful.”).
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protection. 32 Recently, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court held that
conducting  an  investigation  on  a  homeowner’s  front  porch  by  use  of  a  
drug-sniffing   dog   constitutes   a   “search”   within   the   meaning   of   the  
Fourth Amendment.33 The  Court  reasoned  that  a  man’s  right  to  be  free  
from unreasonable government intrusion in his own home is
enumerated and at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.34 The front
porch  of  a  home  has  long  been  held  to  be  within  the  “curtilage”  of  that  
home   and   therefore,   equally   safe   from   the   government’s   physical  
intrusion  upon  “persons,  houses,  papers,  or  effects.”35 The curtilage, or
area  around  a  home,  is  “intimately  linked  to  the  home,  both  physically  
and psychologically,”  and  lends  itself  to  the  most  heightened  privacy  
expectations.36 As per our daily experience,  the  “activity  of  home  life  
extends”   to   the   front   porch,   making   it   the   “classic   exemplar”   of  
curtilage.37 Because  the  officers’  investigation  took  place  on  Jardines’  
front porch, the constitutionally protected curtilage of his home, the
investigation constituted   a   “search.” 38 This search would only be
constitutional  if  the  officers’  conduct  during  the  search  was  a  licensed  
physical intrusion. 39
Thus, it is clear that activity that takes place within a home is
subject to less scrutiny than activity that takes place outside the
confines of this constitutionally sacred space. Logically, at one end of
the spectrum, those who are homeless are forced to expose much of
their behavior and belonging in public spaces in which they do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no Fourth
Amendment protection. 40 As one scholar noted, the   “homeless   are  
essentially   unprotected   by   government   surveillance”   under   the  
“reasonable  expectation  of  privacy”  standard  because  of  the  following  
32

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013).
Id. at 1415.
34
Id. at 1414.
35
Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51, n.3 (2012)).
36
Id. at 1415 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
37
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 , n.12 (1984)).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1415–16.
40
See David Reinbach, The Home Not the Homeless: What the Fourth Amendment
has Historically Protected and Where the Law is Going After Jones, 47 U.S.F.L.
REV. 377, 381–85 (2012) (arguing that the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard does not adequately protect the homeless because of the prominence the
home is given under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
33
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four reasons: their activities are, by necessity, conducted in public;
they  typically  make  their  “home”  on  property  that  they  are  not  entitled  
to be on; their belongings and activities   are   on   “open   fields”   which
common passersby can easily see; and they are almost perpetually
voluntarily exposing themselves to the public.41
Yet, one need not be homeless, in order to experience
diminished privacy under this view of the Fourth Amendment, as even
the working poor experience obvious differentials in privacy. 42 Lowwage workers and the poor generally enjoy reduced privacy
expectations because of the structures where they reside or their
requirement.43 Those living in crowded apartment complexes in close
proximity to others experience less privacy than others in singlefamily detached houses. Similarly, those living in poorly constructed
structures that do not adequately conceal noises or activities within the
home also experience a diminished expectation of privacy that could
ultimately foreclose Fourth Amendment protection. For example,
several scholars have noted that this conception of the Fourth
Amendment protects the privacy of only those wealthy enough to
afford certain tangible privacy enhancements such as a secluded
neighborhood, a spacious yard, fences, or soundproof walls, for
example. 44 Because   “privacy   follows   space”   those   who   have   the  
ability to purchase more space, have more privacy.45
Christopher Slobogin has argued that a number of Supreme
Court  cases  “seriously  undermine  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  applied  to  

41

Id. at 377–88.
See generally Gilman, supra note 3, at 1390 (explaining data collection and
various privacy invasions of the poor in the realm of low-wage workplace and
welfare-receipt).
43
Id. at 1398–99 (detailing numerous ways in which low-wage workers and those on
public assistance experience invasions of privacy such as having public benefits
recipients  “fingerprinted,  and  photographed,  usually through biometric imaging.”).
44
See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the
Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 529, 541–42 (1978) (explaining that the
Fourth  Amendment’s  privacy  protections  exist  primarily  for  “those  wealthy  enough  
to live  exclusively  in  private  places”);;  Slobogin,  supra note 29, at 401 (noting that
the  Fourth  Amendment  protection  varies  according  to  whether  one  has  access  to  “a  
freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision and sound-proof doors
and  walls”).
45
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1270.
42
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poorer   people.” 46 Slobogin catalogues a number of Supreme Court
cases, including those discussing warrantless searches of the homes of
welfare   recipients,   the   Court’s   “container   jurisprudence”   which   has  
been interpreted to mean that any container outside a building may be
search without a warrant, as well as cases involving Fourth
Amendment  seizures,  can  be  construed  to  create  a  “poverty  exception”  
to the Fourth Amendment.47 Slobogin concludes that people who live
in  public  spaces,  and  “people  who  have  difficulty  hiding  or  distancing
their living space from casual observers (for instance those who live in
tenements and other crowded areas) are much more likely to
experience  unregulated  government  intrusions.”48
Furthermore, even though the home has always received
elevated treatment under the Fourth Amendment, the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy standard allows low-income individuals to
experience a reduced rate of privacy even within the sanctity of the
home.49 The poor are often required to divulge information to the state
in order to obtain government assistance and in 2006, in Sanchez v.
San Diego, the Court upheld a home visit against a Fourth Amendment
challenge,   stating   that   “a   person’s   relationship   with   the   state   can  
reduce  that  person’s  expectation  of  privacy,  even  within the sanctity of
the  home.” 50
Outside the context of the home, there are other areas in which
the poor have unequal access to privacy rights. One such instance is
the transportation context. In urban settings, many people walk from
place to place and the Fourth Amendment is not generous to
pedestrians.51 In the street, law enforcement officers need not have any
justification to approach citizens and ask them questions, and this
conduct falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment as long as
the encounter remains consensual. 52 While cars are afforded less
46

Slobogin, supra note 29, at 392.
See generally id. at 400–406.
48
Id. at 401.
49
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
50
Sanchez v. San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 315–316 (1971).
51
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1271.
52
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), 439–440 (finding that brief
questioning on a bus does not constitute a seizure); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 629 (1991) (holding that a police chase of a fleeing suspect was not a seizure
47
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privacy than homes, many low-income people, particularly those in
urban settings, rely on public transportation such as buses and
subways, and the Fourth Amendment treats passengers in these public
modes of transportation much like pedestrians.53
As  Stuntz  so  eloquently  noted,  “Fourth  Amendment  law  makes  
wealthier suspects better off than they otherwise would be and may
make   poorer   suspects   worse   off.” 54 Stuntz goes on to explain that
while the impact of the lack of privacy protections for the poor and for
African-Americans is   unknowable,   it   perhaps   “contributed   to   the  
creation of a prison population increasingly dominated by blacks
punished   for   crack   offenses.” 55 The prominence of the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard combined with the reality that many
urban poor live in areas that subject them to a reduced level of privacy
has prompted much debate about how to ameliorate the class divide
that has developed over the last several decades.56 What if anything
can be done to solve this poverty/privacy dilemma?
II. U.S. V. JONES AND ITS (NON) IMPACT ON THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF
THE URBAN POOR
A. The Narrow Application of the Physical Trespass Doctrine
Will Not Augment the Privacy Rights of the Urban Poor
The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Jones represents a significant
shift in defining what constitutes a search under the Fourth
within the Fourth Amendment); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (finding
that brief questioning in the absence of physical restraint does not constitute a
seizure).
53
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1271.
54
Id. at 1266.
55
Id.
56
Id.  at  1289  (suggesting  the  “Fourth  Amendment  protects  the  wrong  people  because  
it  protects  the  wrong  interest”  and  noting  that  less  constitutional  protection  for  
everyone, including middle class homeowners could correct the inequity. Stuntz
intimates that shifting from privacy to freedom from police violence or
discrimination would be more effective.). See also Carol S. Steiker, How Much
Justice Can You Afford – A Response to Stuntz, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1290, 1294
(1999) (arguing that doctrinal changes such as requiring officers to inform suspects
that they have a right to refuse consent searches and changing the Fourth
Amendment to offer a remedy for pretextual stops based on race or ethnicity would
lead to greater equality).
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Amendment, and this analysis seeks to explore what, if any, impact
this shift will have on the urban poor. In Jones, the government
suspected that the defendant was trafficking in drugs. 57 While the
defendant’s  car  was  parked  in  a  public  parking  lot,  government  agents  
attached  a  GPS  tracking  device  on  the  defendant’s  vehicle  and  tracked  
the  vehicle’s  movements.58 Jones alleged that placing the device on his
car  and  tracking  the  car’s  movements  violated  his  Fourth  Amendment  
right against illegal search.59 The Jones Court announced a unanimous
decision determining that attaching the device indeed constituted a
search. 60 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia focused on the
physical trespass of placing the device   on   Jones’   car   and   noted   that,  
“[b]y attaching the device to the Jeep, [the] officer encroached on a
protected  area.”61
So what is the import of the Jones decision and how does it
affect privacy rights? It makes clear that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy standard did not abandon the physical trespass
doctrine, but instead added to it.62 In the Jones opinion, Justice Scalia
clearly   stated   “the   Katz   reasonable-expectation of privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law  trespassory  test.”63
The majority opinion in Jones elucidates the independent nature of the
trespass test and the reasonable expectation of privacy test. 64 The
Court will first ask whether there was a physical trespass to property.65
If so, then a search has occurred. 66 If there has been no physical
trespass, the inquiry then moves to whether the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property. 67
57

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 949.
61
Id. at 952. But see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the
reasonable expectation of privacy  standard  which  “augmented,  but  did  not  displace  
or diminish, the common law trespassory test  that  preceded  it”);;  id. (Alito, J.,
concurring) (arguing the property-based analysis is problematic and that the
reasonable expectations of privacy standard is the sole determining factor as to
whether government actions implicate the Fourth Amendment).
62
Id. at 952.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 950–53.
65
Id. at 955.
66
Id.
67
Id.
58
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Although the Jones opinion does seem to open the door, albeit
it slightly, for more privacy protections for impoverished individuals
including the homeless or urban poor, the opinion is hardly a
revolutionary tool for protecting the privacy rights of the urban poor.
In fact, as one scholar   noted,   “Jones is unlikely to have significant
precedential   value”   because   the   majority   opinion   only   reiterates   that  
physical trespass implicates the Fourth Amendment, which is not a
novel concept.68
Since Jones relies on the physical trespass theory, it is only
applicable in a narrow set of circumstances. Ironically, the government
is  not  necessarily  required  to  physically  trespass  on  one’s  property,  as  
they did in Jones, to monitor them using GPS or other electronic
modes of surveillance. As Justice Sotomayor explained in her
concurring opinion in Jones, “in   cases   of   electronic   or   other   novel  
modes of surveillance that do not depend upon physical invasion of
property,”  the  Katz analysis is still determinative.69 Furthermore, even
though the reinvigoration of the physical trespass doctrine may, in the
view of some, have the overall effect of strengthening Fourth
Amendment protections, this can hardly be true for the urban poor.
This is primarily so because of the ways in which urban street crimes
are investigated do not rely on physical trespass in the first place, and
searches  of  an  individual’s  person  can  be  justified  on  other  grounds.70
B. Aggressive Policing Tactics Disproportionately Impact the
Privacy Rights of the Urban Poor
The Jones opinion very well may represent an augmentation of
privacy rights in general. At the very least, the decision does remind us
that there are indeed two separate inquiries to determine whether the
government has invaded these rights (has there been a trespass, or
alternatively, has there been a violation of a reasonable expectation of

68

Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability in the
21st Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 303 (2012).
69
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955.
70
Stuntz, supra note 2, at  1271  (“Police  can  approach  anyone  and  ask  questions  with  
no justification at all; as long as the encounter is no more coercive than any policecitizen  encounter  must  be….”).
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privacy). 71 Nevertheless, Jones is not the antidote for the serious
affliction that the lack of Fourth Amendment protection visits upon the
urban poor. The aggressive and sometimes violent manner in which
law enforcement officers investigate crimes in these communities
represents the largest barrier to Fourth Amendment protection. The
physical trespass at issue in Jones (a GPS device unknowingly placed
on his car) pales in comparison to the face-to-face law enforcement
interactions that many residents of poor, urban neighborhoods face on
a daily basis.
One recent example of a law-enforcement strategy that is
employed almost exclusively against the urban poor or minorities is
“Stop   and   Frisk.”   This   practice,   as   it   has   been   implemented   in   New  
York City, has long been controversial. Pursuant to this policy,
officers stop individuals on the street and search them for weapons.
There is a wealth of statistical information to support the notion that
the New York City Police Department has implemented Stop and
Frisk in a racially discriminatory manner.72
In Floyd v. United States, plaintiffs filed a class action suit
arguing that stop and frisk is implemented in an unconstitutional
manner. 73 According to findings in the case, between January 2004
and June 2012, the NYPD made 4.4 million stops. Over 80% of those
stopped were African-American or Latino.74 The Court also found that
the racial composition of a precinct or census tract predicts the stop
rate above and beyond the crime rate.75
From 2004 through 2009, when any law enforcement action
was taken following a stop, African-Americans were 30% more likely
to be arrested (as opposed to receiving a summons) than Whites, for
the same suspected crime. From 2004 through 2009, AfricanAmericans who were stopped were about 14% more likely – and
Latinos 9% more likely – than Whites to be subjected to the use of
71

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955.
See Matthew Bloch, Ford Fessenden & Janet Roberts, Stop, Question and Frisk in
New York Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/11/nyregion/20100711-stop-andfrisk.html?ref=nyregion&_r=0.
73
Floyd v. New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 168.
72
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force. In 2009 alone, African-Americans and Latinos represented 84%
of the people stopped, although African-Americans only comprise
26% of the population of New York City and Latinos only 27%.76 The
New York Civil Liberties Union also reports similar racial disparities.
In 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union reported that of those
stopped, 55% were African-American, 32% were Latino, and 10%
were White.77 Grassroots organizations and class action lawsuits have
brought increased attention to the practice, and recently elected Mayor
Bill de Blasio has vowed to end the practice.78
Several independent commissions examining police behavior
have   found   that   an   “unnecessarily   aggressive”   policing   style   exists  
within many police departments, which unsurprisingly lead to tension
and sometimes to violent contacts between police and citizens.79
The Mollen Commission’s  investigation  of  the  New  York  City  
Police Department in the early 1990s, revealed that while most
officers disapproved of police brutality, many officers willingly
tolerated violence toward suspects. 80 In the late 1990s, New York
City’s   quality   of life policing initiatives, which encouraged custodial
arrests for misdemeanor offenses, resulted in increased citizen
complaints against the police.81
76

NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Statistics, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR-Stop-and-Frisk-Fact-Sheet-2010.pdf (last visited Oct.
7, 2014).
77
Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
78
See Stop-And-Frisk-Appeal Dropped By Mayor Bill de Blasio, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/30/stop-and-frisk-appealdropped-mayor-de-blasio_n_4695930.html (discussing lawsuits regarding New
York’s  stop  and  frisk policy and explaining that de  Blasio  “made  settling  the  stopand-frisk  issue  a  major  component  of  his  campaign”).
79
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 495 (2004); See also id. at 495–501 (detailing findings of the
Christopher Commission, the Kolts Commission, and the Mollen Commission, all of
which indicated that police brutality is a systemic problem).
80
CITY OF N.Y. COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMMISSION
REPORT 49 (1994) (“As  important  as  the  possible  extent  of  brutality,  is  the  extent  of  
brutality  tolerance  we  found  throughout  the  department.”).
81
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 378 (1998) (noting the sharp
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The Christopher Commission, which examined the policies and
practices of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the wake
of  the  Rodney  King  beating,  reported  that  the  LAPD  rewarded  “hardnosed”   tactics,   and   focused   on   crime   control   rather   than   crime  
prevention.82 The LAPD also implemented a flawed evaluation system
that evaluated officers based used statistical measures including the
number of arrests made and the number of calls to which they
responded.83 Simultaneously, the LAPD trained officers to engage in
aggressive crime prevention techniques that resulted in a high rate of
street encounters. 84 The Christopher Commission concluded that the
combination   of   these   strategies   resulted   in   a   “siege   (‘we/they’)  
mentality”  between  officers  and  citizens.85
These aggressive tactics are typically reserved for traditionally
disadvantaged or marginalized members of society, and there is an
overwhelming consensus that minorities experience a greater rate of
police brutality and misconduct. 86 As I. Bennett Capers explains,
increase in citizen complaints against the police upon the initiation of order
maintenance policing).
82
INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION OF THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT XIV (1991) (“Witness  after  
witness testified to unnecessarily aggressive confrontations between LAPD officers
and citizens, particularly  members  of  minority  communities.”).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See, e.g., CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST. AT HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL FOR THE NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN
MINORITY COMMUNITIES 293 (1995) (explaining how racism contributes to the way
in which  police  “perform  their  law  enforcement  functions”); RONALD WEITZER &
STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 71
(2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1998) [hereinafter Shielded from
Justice], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uspol986.pdf (“Race  
continues  to  play  a  central  role  in  police  brutality  in  the  United  States.”);;  Craig  B.  
Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and
Disciplinary  Practices:  The  Chicago  Police  Department’s  Broken  System, 1 DEPAUL
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 251, 267–68, 289–91 (2008) (detailing particular events and
patterns of police brutality and misconduct and how it disproportionately impacts
minorities); Clifford L. Broman et al., The Experience and Consequences of
Perceived Racial Discrimination: A Study of African Americans, 26 J. BLACK
PSYCHOL. 165, 175–76 (2000) (detailing the impact of perceived discrimination on
African Americans as a people); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment,
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“police  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  force  when  dealing  with  members  
of outgroups (those who are poor or minority or gender nonconforming)   than   when   dealing   with   members   of   ingroups.” 87 For
example, in a 1998 report, Human Rights Watch examined police
departments   in   14   major   United   States   cities   and   found   that   “race  
continues to play a central role in police brutality in the United
States.”88 In a 1996 Bureau of Justice Statistics report, data showed
that while African-American and Hispanics represented only 20% of
the population, they made up half of the documented cases of police
brutality across the country.89 Similarly, a 1996 Amnesty International
Report reviewing police misconduct in New York City found that
nearly all of the victims who died while in police custody were racial
minorities.90
C. The Privacy/Poverty Dilemma Causes Tangible and
Intangible Harms to Affected Communities
Racial minorities, such as African-Americans and Latinos, are
disproportionately represented in the poor urban communities that are
the focus of this Article. 91 The racial and class distinctions are

51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 388–89 (1998) (explaining that police brutality and
misconduct remains a problem for minorities).
87
I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
959, 982 (2013); see also, id. at 982, n.135 (statistical  data  shows  “significant  
disparities in the use of deadly force based on the race of the shooting victim/subject
and that virtually all of this disparity occurs as a result of the Memphis policy that
allows  officers  to  exercise  their  discretion  to  shoot  fleeing  property  crime  suspects.”  
(citing Brief for Appellee–Respondent at 23–26, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1
(1985) (Nos. 83–1035, 83–1070))).
88
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE, supra note 86.
89
Roberto Suro, Study Says Cops Used Force v. 500,000, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1997, at 21.
90
AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (1996),
available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/036/1996/en/7b6bf842-eb05-11ddaad1-ed57e7e5470b/amr510361996en.pdf.
91
See Jane W. Gibson-Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, and Justice:
Looking Where the Streetlight Shines, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99 (1994).
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inherently intertwined. Thus, it is not surprising that racial minorities
tend to distrust law enforcement officials.92
This unfair targeting and mistreatment of the urban poor and
minorities and the perceptions of bias reduce the legitimacy of law
enforcement in these communities. Reduced legitimacy in these
communities causes other harms, or at least prevents the community
from experiencing the benefits of legitimacy. 93 It is well established
that individuals are more likely to comply with the law and cooperate
in police investigations if they believe that their law enforcement
institutions are legitimate.94
D. The Harms of a Failing Fourth Amendment
There is no doubt that as a society, we are all subject to
government surveillance. When walking through any major city street
in the United States, street cameras capture the likenesses of millions
of residents, and many jurisdictions have the capability to aggregate
data from multiple locations and to share information among various
agencies.95 Many metropolitan areas have thousands of cameras that
allow police to monitor citizen activities on public streets. 96 Such
surveillance has been deemed constitutional under the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy standard and would undoubtedly meet the

92

See I. Bennet Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 877–78
(2008) (explaining that people  in  poor  and  minority  communities  “distrust  the  police  
and  question  the  fairness  of  the  criminal  justice  system”).
93
See generally id. at 837 (detailing a study done by scholar Tom Tyler which
showed that the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement influences compliance).
See also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffery Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
231,  267  (2008)  (“Cooperation  increases  not  only  when  the  public  views  the  police
as effective in controlling crime and maintaining social order, but also when citizens
see  the  police  as  legitimate  authorities  who  are  entitled  to  be  obeyed.”).
94
See generally id.
95
See Capers, supra note 87, at 960–63 (describing the use of surveillance systems
in major metropolitan areas and even small towns).
96
For example, in 2006 New York had almost 4,200 public and private surveillance
cameras, and in 2009, Washington D.C. was estimated to have more than 5,200
cameras owned by city agencies. Id. at 961–62.
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physical trespass standard recently reinvigorated in the Jones
decision.97
Despite the fact that many Americans are subject to
surveillance and suffer some unknown deprivations of privacy, it is
also   true   however,   that   “police   undoubtedly   are   fixated   on   the   urban  
poor.” 98 Ironically, however, police may be reserving less intrusive
forms of surveillance, such as cameras, for more affluent
neighborhoods while reserving more intrusive interactions, such as
stop and frisk initiatives, for the urban poor. For example, in New
York,  cameras  “appear  least  where they are desired most: in some of
the  city’s  most  crime-ridden neighborhoods, among residents of public
housing who have been experiencing mounting violence and all of its
attendant  psychological  disruption.”99
There is a wealth of research and commentary devoted to
determining why police officers reserve aggressive tactics for poor
communities. Scholars have posited that perhaps the framers of the
Constitution were concerned only with protecting middle-class values
(although it is difficult to imagine that they could have envisioned the
structural and cultural landscape that contributes to the class divide in
privacy law).100
One possible explanation for the inequity is that it is easier and
less costly for police to investigate low-level drug crimes in inner-city
neighborhoods than to investigate these offenses in other markets.101
Others offer the more disconcerting view that   “a   court interested in
crime control might want Fourth Amendment rules that make it
relatively easy to search and seize the class of people most likely to
commit crime – the   poor.” 102 Of course, the premise that the poor
97

See United  States  v.  Knotts,  460  U.S.  276,  281  (1983)  (“A  person  traveling  in  an  
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements  from  one  place  to  another.”);;  see also, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945; Katz, 389
U.S. 347.
98
Slobogin, supra note 29, at 408.
99
Capers, supra note 87, at 989, n.178 (quoting Gina Bellafante, The  Watchmen’s  
Misdirected Gaze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at B1).
100
Slobogin, supra note 29, at 406.
101
See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1282 (noting  that  it  is  “cheap”  for  law  enforcement  to  
police street markets).
102
Slobogin, supra note 29, at 406.
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commit more crime is spurious, given that the poor are
disproportionately targeted by law enforcement. 103 Overt racism and
implicit stereotyping on the part of police officers, exacerbated by the
lack of political power poor urban residents wield, also presents a
plausible explanation for the continued use of aggressive law
enforcement strategies.104 Aggressive tactics such as raids, sweeps and
stop and frisks frequently occur in areas already experiencing
concentrated poverty.105
In addition to determining the causes of the divide, it is also
important to explore the resulting harms of this class divide regarding
privacy rights. Generally, in the privacy context, if the government
infringes  upon  one’s  privacy  there  may  be  a  serious  question  as  to  the  
relative harm such an infringement imposes.106 For many Americans,
the additional surveillance or advances in technology, while arguably
diminishing their privacy, may have no appreciable effect on their
daily lives. For example, it is difficult to discern whether and to what
extent one experiences harm if the government tracks the whereabouts
103

See Gibson-Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 91, at 100–01 (arguing that the
common notion that the poor commit disproportionately more crime in the United
States  is  flawed  because  of  the  community’s  and  the  police’s  “focus  on  street  crimes  
[which] hides suite crimes and diverts our attention from such laws which protect the
harms, many of which are indeed violent, committed by those with wealth and
power”).
104
See Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails
as an Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black
Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 761–62  (2005)  (“Police  
racism and misconduct frequently are attributed to the over-enforcement of laws in
Black  communities,”  which  “gives  rise  to  an  adversarial  model  of  policing  in  which  
racial profiling, pretextual stops, unlawful searches and arrests, botched raids,
excessive force, murder,  and  corruption  abound.”);;  see also Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance
Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 835–36 (1999) (arguing that
aggressive policing tactics, such as order-maintenance policing,  “reinforces  
stereotypes that portray Blacks as lawless and legitimate police harassment in Black
communities”).
105
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 56–57 (2003) (arguing that unfair treatment in the criminal justice
system, like overly-aggressive  policing  tactics,  falls  “largely  on  the  poor,  the  
minorities, and the disenfranchised, ensuring continued public support for crime
control  measures”).
106
See Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1249, 1275–80  (2012)  (discussing  the  “harms”  associated  with  governmental  
intrusion of privacy).
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of their vehicle but never uses the information. 107 The harms
associated with reduced privacy rights for residents of inner-city
impoverished areas are readily discernible because they are
implemented in a more intrusive manner.108 Furthermore, when bias is
infused into this inquiry, the harm of that bias itself has its own
implications.109
This loss of trust and refusal to cooperate with police has
dangerous implications for communities, especially those communities
that could benefit from partnerships between citizens and police to
prevent and investigate crime.110 As Bret Asbury notes,
“[c]itizens are more disposed to cooperate with police
when institutions enjoy a high level of legitimacy. The
perceived legitimacy of an institution, it has been
shown, depends largely on whether citizens perceive
that they are receiving fair and respectful treatment by
police and other decision makers. In effect, citizens
reciprocate respectful treatment with cooperation and

107

See Steve Vladeck, The Clapper Fix: Congress and Standing to Challenge Secret
Surveillance, LAWFARE (June 20, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/the-clapper-fix-congress-and-standing-tochallenge-secret-surveillance/ (discussing the inherent issues in the Clapper v.
Amnesty International holding,  that  plaintiffs  lack  standing  if  they  cannot  “prove  that  
interception  of  their  communications  under  section  702  [is]  ‘certainly  impending,’  
and  therefore  [can]  not  satisfy  the    ‘injury-in-fact’  prong  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  test  
for  Article  III  standing”); see also Liz Clark Rinehart, Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA: Allowing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to Turn
“Incidentally”  Into  “Certainly,” 73 MD. L. REV. 1018, 1039 (2014) (arguing the
inherent  “catch-22”  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  standing  requirement  for  plaintiffs,  in  
that  plaintiffs  “must  show  they  have  been  or will certainly be the targets of
surveillance,”  but  “will  be  unable  to  show  the  requisite  actual  injury  since  they  will  
be unable [to] show specific knowledge  of  the  surveillance…if they are not
permitted  discovery,”  due  to  the  government’s  ability  to  invoke the state secrets
doctrine).
108
Stuntz, supra note  2,  at  1285  (“Street  stops  and  sweeps  can  be  very  intrusive  
indeed, but the privacy intrusion is not as great as in house searches….”).
109
Id.  (discussing  the  “racial  tilt”  associated  with  Fourth  Amendment privacy rights).
110
See Capers, supra note 92, at 842 (explaining that perceived illegitimacy of law
enforcement leads to a lack of compliance and increased crime).
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Furthermore,   “[c]orruption   and   brutality   undermine   the   legitimacy of
governmental authority and reduce the willingness of citizens to
comply with the law. Left unchecked, police misconduct often triggers
racial  tension  because  “[p]oor  people  of  color  bear  the  brunt  of  police
abuse.”112 The failure to create these partnerships because of violent
encounters ironically may result in perpetuating more crime within
these vulnerable communities.
Whatever the cause of this fixation on the urban poor or the
tangible or intangible harms that result from this fixation, it is
inconsistent with our  notions  of  liberty  and  democracy  that  a  person’s  
economic status should determine the extent of her constitutional
rights.
III. THE URBAN POOR AND THE ELUSIVE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Communities are increasingly becoming distrustful of lawenforcement and civil unrest in poor urban neighborhoods often stems
from negative interactions between citizens and police. 113 Thus, the
tangible and intangible harms resulting from the class divide in
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment require immediate
solutions.
Unfortunately, the Fourth Amendment standards articulated by
the Supreme Court have allowed these aggressive policing tactics to
go unchecked, and therefore may be partially to blame for the growing
sense of discontent in many of these communities. In addition to the
fact that the Katz analysis is still likely to apply to activities of the
111

Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2002).
112
Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of
How Civilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009); see also Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Expectations of
Police Traffic Stop Behavior, 27 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES &
MGMT. 487, 488 (2004) (noting that studies have shown that people are more likely
to  “defer  to  the  law  and  refrain  from  illegal  behavior”  when  police treat them fairly).
113
See Capers, supra note 92, at 877–78.
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urban poor, embedded within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are
other fundamental impediments to robust Fourth Amendment rights
for this frequently marginalized group.
A. Lax Constitutional Standards Permit Reduced Fourth
Amendment Protections
First, Terry v. Ohio, one of the most important criminal
procedure cases of the twentieth century, allowed police officers to
stop suspects on less than probable cause.114 The   Court’s   opinion  in  
Terry allowed officers to perform a pat-down   of   a   suspect’s   outer  
clothing if the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the
suspect was armed.115 This was the first time the Court had approved a
search of a person based on a standard less than probable cause.116 The
Court mused that if the standard for such searches remained too high,
officers would nevertheless conduct such searches, resulting in the
dilution of the probable cause standard.117
Second,  the  Court’s  current jurisprudence offers no protection
against pre-textual stop. 118 The   Court’s   decision   in   Whren approved
pre-textual stops, which allows law enforcement officers to stop
individuals if they have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for one
violation, even if the underlying reason for a stop was based on a
suspected violation for which the officer did not have reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify a stop. 119 Experts have fiercely
criticized the Whren decision as an open invitation for police officers
to abuse their discretion and stop citizens in an arbitrary and
discriminatory fashion.120
114

392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
Id. at 26–27.
116
Id.  at  21  (setting  forth  the  standard  of  reasonable  suspicion  where  an  “officer  
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences  from  those  facts,  reasonably  warrant  that  intrusion”).
117
Id. at  14  (explaining  that  the  exclusionary  rule  “is  powerless  to  deter  invasions  of  
constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving
some  other  goal”).
118
Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13.
119
Id.
120
Jennifer R. Walters, United States v. Whren: The U.S. Supreme Court Determines
the Constitutional Reasonableness of Pretextual Traffic Stops and Tips the Scales in
Favor of Law Enforcement, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 247, 275–76  (1997)  (“police
115

Simmons

2014]

FUTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

265

Lax constitutional standards have allowed over-policing and
aggressive police tactics to go unchecked. 121 Perhaps these practices
would have failed to flourish if stricter constitutional standards
prohibited them. Heightened constitutional standards, such as
prohibiting pre-textual stops and requiring officers to have more than
mere reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, would strengthen the
Fourth Amendment rights for the urban poor. Thus, protecting the
Fourth Amendment rights for residents of inner-city neighborhoods
will necessarily include fundamental changes in the doctrine that are
not forthcoming. A lack of stricter constitutional standards has
tolerated, if not blatantly encouraged, the use of aggressive police
tactics in many communities.122 Put simply, poor urban communities
are policed in a completely different manner than wealthy
communities. 123 Wealthy communities may be policed by private
are essentially given unfettered discretion in making traffic stops to test their
suspicions,  thereby  subjecting  motorists  to  arbitrary  traffic  stops,”  a  power  that  “has  
been used disproportionately against African-Americans and Hispanics, due to
police  readiness  to  view  minorities  in  general  as  potential  offenders.”);;  see also
Craig M. Glantz, “Could”  This  Be  the  End  of  Fourth  Amendment  Protections  for  
Motorists?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 864, 864 (1997) (asserting that the
Whren Court’s  “purely  objective  approach  to  police  traffic  stops…actually facilitates
arbitrary  searches  and  seizures…[and] protects the use of impermissible bases by
police officers  to  effect  traffic  stops….”);; David O. Markus, Whren v. United States:
A Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 97
(1998)  (arguing  that  “[w]here  an  officer  is  using  a  traffic  violation  as  a  pretext  for  
pulling one over for drugs, gender, or race, that unconstitutional reason is the
motivation  behind  the  stop,”  and  due  to  the  prevalence  of  minor  offenses,  every  man  
is  subject  to  the  whims  of  every  officer,  which  is  “precisely  the  kind  of  arbitrary  
authority which gave rise to  the  Fourth  Amendment.”).
121
See Walters, supra note 120, at 275–76  (“Conversely,  some  police  officers  
believe it is their responsibility to enforce all laws and the Whren decision merely
gives  them  discretion  to  do  so.”).
122
Id. at 277 (explaining that because  of  lax  constitutional  standards,  “the  intrusion  
into the privacy of ordinary citizens will increase by aggressive police tactics
targeted  at  identifying  criminals….”).
123
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1820
(2005) (“‘The  rich  will  be  increasingly  policed  preventatively  by  commercial  
security while the poor will be policed reactively by enforcement-oriented public
police,’  with  both  the  private  and  public  sector  working  to  ‘protect  the  affluent  from  
the poor – the one by barricading and excluding, the other by repressing and
imprisoning.’”  (quoting  David  H.  Bayley  &  Clifford  D.  Shearing,  The Future of
Policing, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 585, 594, 602 (1996))); Taslitz, supra note 105, at
56 (“Consent  searches  and  quality  of  life policing are used disproportionately against
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security forces to   “protect”   them   while   law   enforcement   officers  
employ reactionary tactics in poor communities.124 Practices such as
stop and frisk are used to investigate and deter crime in certain areas,
and would not be tolerated in communities with the political capital to
stop these policies.125 This differential treatment is not accidental and
“[p]olice   are   exquisitely   sensitive   to   political   considerations   and  
understand that the use of aggressive tactics in middle class White
neighborhoods would evoke widespread outrage.”126
Thus, as a whole, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has gaping
holes that allow officers unfettered discretion with the possibility of
abuse. These policies disproportionately impact individuals, often
urban-dwelling members of minority groups with lower
socioeconomic status. While Jones’  focus  on  physical  trespass  may  be  
seen as a positive development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it
is hardly the antidote for inequalities that exist in privacy distribution.
IV. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE FROM PRIVACY TO POLICING
A. Possible Solutions to the Privacy/Poverty Dilemma
Jones’  emphasis  on  physical  trespass  will  not  remedy  the  fatal  
flaws in current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, those
African  Americans.”); Gibson-Carpenter & Carpenter, supra note 91, at 101
(explaining  that  “[i]nner-city schools are more likely than those in wealthier areas to
call  upon  police”  for  a  formal  handling  when  children get in trouble, whereas
children from wealthier areas are more likely to be referred to their parents).
124
Sklansky, supra note 123, at 1820.
125
See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 687 (1994) (arguing  that  “stop  and  
frisk”  tactics  have  a  “disproportionate  impact  on  the  poor,  and  on  racial  and  ethnic  
minorities.”).  In  fact,  it  was  political  activism  and  widespread  and  prolonged  protest  
in New York City that has been credited with efforts to halt stop and frisk as it was
practiced in New York. Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 330
(2013) (discussing the class action filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights
against  the  City  of  New  York  in  1999  “alleging unconstitutional racial profiling in
the  Department’s  stop-and-frisk  program,”  which  resulted  in  a  consent  decree  four  
years  later  “to  implement  a  number  of  remedial  measures  intended  to  reduce  racial  
disparities  in  stops  and  frisks”).  The  city  has  had ongoing lawsuits and protests, one
of those protests occurring in the summer of 2012, where thousands of people
marched  to  end  the  “stop-and-frisk”  policies  of  the  New  York  Police  Department.  Id.
at 329.
126
Taslitz, supra note 105, at 56.
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seeking to reform this flaw in the criminal justice system should
refocus the debate about privacy and poverty under the Fourth
Amendment to other legislative efforts to ensure greater equality for
members of poor urban communities.
First, the federal government and local communities should
implement rules that require police departments to keep detailed and
accurate records regarding who is stopped and for what reasons. It is
notoriously difficult to provide the requisite proof to substantiate a
racial profiling claim. 127 However, recordkeeping is the first step in
transparency, and knowing that they will be held accountable for those
they  stop  may  deter  police  officers  from  violating  citizens’  rights.      
Representative John Conyers and others in Congress have
repeatedly tried to pass federal legislation that would address racial
profiling. Conyers first proposed the Traffic Stops Statistics Act in
1997, but efforts to pass this legislation failed. 128 Then in 2001,
Conyers introduced a more comprehensive End Racial Profiling Act of
2001.129 Despite bi-partisan support, this Act also failed to pass but
was reintroduced in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013.130
The End Racial Profiling Act would prohibit and attempt to eliminate
racial profiling by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies and would allow the federal government or private plaintiffs
to sue for declaratory or injunctive relief. 131 Furthermore, the law
127

J. Michael McGuinness, State and Federal Standards Require Proof of
Discriminatory Intent in Ethnic Profiling Claims, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 29,
33  (2003)  (“Ethnic  Profiling  claims  are  generally  difficult  to  establish  because  of  the  
ill-defined intent-based discrimination standard.”).
128
See Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring
data to be collected during all traffic stops for trend analysis); see also Traffic Stops
Statistics Study Act of 1999, S. 821, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring the Attorney
General to collect data of traffic stops by law enforcement officers for subsequent
trend analysis).
129
See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001) (expanding
the aim of Congressman Conyers’ proposed legislation).
130
End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, H.R. 3847, 108th Cong. (2004); End Racial
Profiling Act of 2005, S. 2138, 109th Cong. (2005); End Racial Profiling Act of
2007, H.R. 4611, 110th Cong. (2007); End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748,
111th Cong. (2010); End Racial Profiling Act of 2011, H.R. 3618, 112th Cong.
(2011); End Racial Profiling Act of 2013, H.R. 2851 113th Cong. (2013).
131
See End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748, 112th Cong. (2010) (refining a
definition of racial profiling). The proposed legislation states:
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would   authorize   the   United   States   Department   of   Justice   (“DOJ”)   to  
provide   grants   for   “the   development   and   implementation   of   best  
policing practices, such as, early warning tracking systems, technology
integration, and other management protocols that discourage
profiling.”132
Many civil right groups, including the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties
Union, have supported the passage of this legislation that would
specifically prohibit racial profiling, yet Congress has repeatedly
failed to pass the End Racial Profiling Act. 133 Despite the failure to
pass such legislation at the federal level, many states have passed their
own legislation aimed at addressing racial profiling.134 More than half
of  the  nation’s  states  have  enacted  legislation  either  prohibiting racial
profiling or requiring jurisdictions within the state to collect data on
law enforcement stops and searches. 135 Several states that do not
statutorily prohibit racial profiling have voluntarily agreed to collect
information related to race and criminal stops.136 Efforts to pass state
and local legislation requiring police departments to collect and
analyze data should continue.

[T]he practice of a law enforcement agent or agency relying, to any
degree, on race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion in selecting
which individual to subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory
activities or in deciding upon the scope and substance of law
enforcement activity following the initial investigatory procedure,
except when there is trustworthy information, relevant to the
locality and timeframe, that links a person of a particular race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion to an identified criminal
incident or scheme. Id.
132
156 CONG. REC. E1341–02 (daily ed. Jul. 15, 2010) (Statement of Rep. John
Conyers).
133
Press Release, ACLU, Forum Calls on Congress and Administration to End
Racial Profiling: ACLU Hosts Event to Stop Discrimination (Oct. 27, 2011),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/three_faces_merged_document.pdf;
Press Release, NAACP, NAACP-Supported End Racial Profiling Act Introduced in
the U.S. Senate (Oct. 6, 2011), available at http://www.naacp.org/actionalerts/entry/naacp-supported-end-racial-profiling-act-introduced-in-the-u.s.-senate.
134
Legislation and Litigation, DATA COLLECTION RESOURCE CTR. AT
NORTHEASTERN UNIV., http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/ (accessed
through archive-edu.com) (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (describing legislation passed
by different states to end racial profiling).
135
Id.
136
Id.
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Second, communities should focus on redistributing police
resources to areas where they are most needed, but with a focus on
creating police-citizen partnerships. Redistribution of resources means
redistribution not only of monetary resources, but redistributing
personnel from over-policed areas and investigating serious violent
crimes rather than drug offenses.
Alongside this redistribution should come increased funding
for specialized training that will ensure that police officers are better
equipped to address crime in underserved communities. Every year,
the COPS (Community Oriented Policing) program distributes
millions of dollars to local communities.137 This funding could be used
to incentivize local communities not only to strengthen community
partnerships – which it does – but programs could be developed to
allow residents of underserved communities greater autonomy in
setting priorities for their law-enforcement needs. 138 Communities
might witness changes in how their communities are policed, perhaps
with police departments shifting from drug enforcement to focusing
primarily on preventing and investigating violent offenses.
Third, there should be greater regulation of police tactics and
stricter accountability mechanisms in place for police officers. The
federal  government’s  “pattern  or  practice”  authority offers one model
for infusing greater equality into the criminal justice system. 139 In
1994, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a statute that seeks to
address the policies and practices of a police agency, and has shown
great promise in spurring institutional reforms in several local law
enforcement agencies.140 Pursuant  to  its  “pattern  or  practice”  authority  
under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ has required several police
departments nationwide, including the Los Angeles Police Department
137

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COPS OFFICE FY2014 APPLICATION GUIDE: COMMUNITY
POLICING DEVELOPMENT (CPD) 1 (2014), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2014AwardDocs/CPD/2014-CPD-AppGuide26.pdf.
138
Id. at 2.
139
Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/polmis.php (last
visited Oct. 23, 2014).
140
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to conduct
investigations  and,  if  warranted,  file  civil  litigation  to  eliminate  a  “pattern  or  practice  
of conduct by law  enforcement  officers…that deprives persons of rights, privileges,
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States”).
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and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, to
reform their policies and practices.141 Section 14141 grants the federal
government the authority to sue for injunctive relief to change policies
within a local police department where DOJ has found a pattern or
practice of constitutional violations.142
Generally, the resulting consent decrees or agreements have
included reforms of both substantive and procedural policies to create
more transparency and ensure accountability.143 One reform includes
modifying use of force policies to provide guidelines regarding what
type of force is appropriate in apprehending a suspect and defining or
limiting circumstances when certain uses of force are appropriate.144
141

Press  Release,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  Justice,  Justice  Department  Reaches  Agreement  to  
Resolve Police Misconduct Case Against Columbus Police Department (Sept. 4,
2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/September/02_crt_503.htm
(“Today’s  agreement  is  the  eighth  settlement  under  the  1994  Crime  Bill.”).  “Other  
settlements entered during the Bush Administration include the Cincinnati Police
Department, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and the
Highland  Park,  Illinois  Police  Department.”    Id.  Additionally,  “[t]he  Justice  
Department continues to monitor settlements covering the Los Angeles Police
Department, the New Jersey State Police, the Steubenville, Ohio Police Department
and the Pittsburgh  Bureau  of  Police.”  Id.
142
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b)  (2006)  (“[T]he  Attorney  General,  for  or  in  the  name  of  
the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory
relief to eliminate  the  practice.”).
143
See Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States and the City of Mt.
Prospect, Illinois 3 (Jan. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement],
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mtprospect_moa.pdf (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011) (listing the different procedures the police department was required to
implement pursuant to the written policy).
144
Letter  from  Shanetta  Y.  Cutlar,  Chief,  Special  Litigation  Section,  U.S.  Dep’t  of  
Justice,  to  Subodh  Chandra,  Director,  Dep’t  of  Law, City of Cleveland 1 (Feb. 9,
2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cleveland_uof_final.pdf (agreement
required the modification of the use of force policy, including prohibiting officers
from  “intentionally  firing  at  moving vehicles unless there is imminent danger of
death or serious injury, and other means are not available to avert or eliminate the
threat,  and,  where  feasible,  some  warning  has  been  given”);;  Press  Release,  U.S.  
Dep’t  of  Justice,  Justice  Department  Reaches  Agreement with Buffalo Police
Department to Resolve Police Misconduct Investigation (Sep. 19, 2002),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/September/02_crt_535.htm (agreement
required the modification of the use of force policy specifically for the use of
chemical sprays by implementing a new policy, but also required the police
department to revise general use of force policies and procedures for reporting all
uses of force); Memorandum of Agreement, United States Department of Justice and
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department (Jun. 13, 2001),
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DOJ has also required the implementation of an early warning
tracking system to help supervisors identify officers who might need
to be re-trained or disciplined.145 Collecting this type of information
and using it to make training and personnel decisions may deter the
intentional wrongdoing of individual officers.
Another DOJ reform entailed the implementation of fair and
comprehensive complaint processes for citizens who wish to report
alleged misconduct. 146 Many citizens, especially minorities, are
reluctant to file complaints against police officers because they simply
believe that their complaints will not be fairly processed. 147 To ensure
fairness and reduce the possibility for retaliation, officers assigned to
investigate citizen complaints should be sufficiently independent from
the officers they are investigating. DOJ has also required several
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php (the agreement required
the police department to implement general use of force policy modifications that
emphasized de-escalation procedures, such as advisements, warnings, and verbal
persuasion, as well as specific modifications regarding the use of firearms, canines
and Oleoresin Capsicum Spray).
145
See United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 00-11769 GAF (RCx) (C.D.
Cal.) (Order Re: Transition Agreement), at 5–7,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/US_v_LosAngeles_TAOrder_071709.pdf (mandating the continued use of a Training, Evaluation, and
Management  System  (“TEAMS  II”)  “in  the  manner in which it was intended – an
early  warning  or  risk  management  system”);;  Memorandum  of  Agreement  Between  
the United States Department of Justice and the City of Buffalo, New York and the
Buffalo Police Department, the Police Benevolent Association, Inc., and the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Local 264, 5–6,
¶¶ 20–23 (Sep. 19, 2002), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-NY0004-0001.pdf (requiring the creation of a management and supervision system for
tracking excessive use of force incidents and complaints and using them to correct
police  officer  conduct  through  evaluation  and  training,  akin  to  an  “early  warning  
system”);;  Memorandum of Agreement, United States Department of Justice and the
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department,
Section I(A)(2) (Jun. 13, 2001),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/dcmoa.php    (“[T]he Department of
Justice has provided MPD with on-going technical assistance recommendations
regarding its use of force policies and procedures, training, investigations, complaint
handling, canine program and early warning tracking system. Based upon these
recommendations, MPD has begun to implement necessary reforms in the manner in
which it investigates, monitors,  and  manages  use  of  force  issues.”).
146
See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 143, at 7 (describing the complaint
process available to members of the public).
147
Police Brutality: Only a Minority, ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 1997), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/154487.
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jurisdictions to compile information related to racial profiling. 148
Compiling and publishing information related to race and stops and
searches may help jurisdictions determine whether officers are
disproportionately stopping racial minorities. With vigorous
enforcement,  DOJ’s  pattern  or  practice  authority  could  lead  to  reforms  
that will ultimately address many of the systemic issues contributing to
the inequities in policing.
Finally, communities must insist that police departments
implement less antagonistic models of policing. As the Boston Police
Commissioner recently imparted to recruits at the police academy,
“[officers]   shouldn’t   come   out of the academy now thinking of
[them]selves as soldiers ready for battle, but as problem-solvers in this
city’s  neighborhoods.”149 And the community may even be willing to
support more surveillance in the form of less intrusive methods such
as strategically placed cameras that might capture crimes committed
by citizens and Fourth Amendment violations committed by the
police.150
Serious conversations about the poor and police surveillance
should be refocused on the legislative efforts and public policies that
change the manner in which police officers prevent and investigate
criminal activity in impoverished neighborhoods. In conclusion, the
focus must be upon solutions that do not rely upon a shift in the
Court’s   jurisprudence,   but   solutions   for   which   local communities
could advocate and implement.
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See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 143, at 7 (describing the complaint
process available to members of the public).
149
Peter Gelzinis, Hub’s  New  Top  Cop  Has  Persevered,  BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 21,
2014.
150
See Capers, supra note 87, at 977–89 (advocating for more surveillance in the
form of video cameras as a way to increase safety and encourage more egalitarian
and race-neutral policing).

